This post isn’t about relativism itself, but about one current use of the term: to refer not to the belief that morality is just a matter of the norms of a culture, but to refer to the belief that both sides in a conflict have done nasty stuff (or whatever). The first is crazy, because it implies if in a given culture it’s normal to kill gays just for being gay, or cut up the genitals of ever little girl born in that culture, then those things would be moral. But surely there are lots of situations where the second is an appropriate attitude: plenty of gang wars, tribal wars, feudal wars, religious was, and conflicts between Roman and Byzantine politicians all fall into that category. Example of what I’m complaining about here, see also this.
Can’t relativism also be used to describe certain non-objective moral systems? I have seen it used that way before at least (here:http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2009/01/desire-utilitarianism-and-objective_06.html and here:http://barefootbum.blogspot.com/2007/02/meta-ethical-subjective-relativism-part.html)
Hey Chris, could you be a little bit more vague?
Drefcinski differentiates between descriptive relativism and moral relativism in his paper
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Descriptive relativism observes that what is believed to be morally correct varies among different individuals and different cultures. Descriptive relativism is a factual outlook; it is an empirical thesis about cultural diversity. More precisely, it states that “different individuals and different societies accept different moral beliefs or standards and thus disagree about the answers to moral questions.”(Dr. Shane Drefcinski, The Superficial Sophistication of Moral Relativism, pp1-2)
Drefcinski defines moral relativism this way:
The second type of relativism concerning ethics is moral relativism. Moral relativism states that what is morally correct is relative to different individuals or cultures. More precisely, “moral judgments are not objectively true or false and thus… different individuals or societies can hold conflicting moral judgments without any of them being mistaken.” Moral relativism goes beyond the empirical observations of descriptive relativism; it is a normative outlook. Someone who accepts moral relativism denies that there exist some universal, objectively true, and possibly absolute moral norms that all humans and societies ought to accept. Hence, moral relativism is often contrasted with moral absolutism.(Ibid, p3)
So, I think your first definition is referring to moral relativism. However, your second definition is less than clear. Could you elaborate?
My second version of relativism isn’t anything sophisticated philosophers discuss–it’s a political buzzword. I don’t know of any better way to explain it than pointing to the two links at the end. Maybe this would have been clearer had I quoted directly from them, so take a look at them, and see if what I’m saying makes sense then.
Sorry, I understood what you were talking about I just thought you meant that relativism should only apply to cultural relativism and not to the kind discussed in the links.
Thanks for clearing it up.
Okay, I had a chance to follow some links on the confabulum blog, and I now see what you were referring to.
So, would you say that you are opposed to moral relativism in its philosophical sense?