The nature of truth is often thought to have consequences for our thinking about religion, morality, and politics–not abstract consequences of the sort philosophers talk about, but the sort of consequences likely to come up on an op-ed page. It occurs to me, though, that there may be two different meanings of “truth” we’re dealing with here, and this is likely to obscure these debates:
(1) How things are, as opposed to how they aren’t
(2) A particular desirable property of our beliefs and assertions
It seems that (2) is easier to worry about than (1), but if the distinction isn’t made, we can make both the mistake of worrying about (1) because of worries about (2) and the mistake of thinking (2) must be held sacred for the sake of (1).
A very commonplace sort of worry about (2) is that human minds are limited in a great many ways, so how could we ever have absolute truth? Some of the pop relativists who talk this way, though, seem to think it’s also an argument against (1). It’s not. Going the other way, in analytic philosophy the Churchlands have spent a lot of time attacking the weaknesses of “folk psychology,” suggesting a complete theory of how the brain works would do without such notions as “beliefs.” However, if you don’t have beliefs, you can’t have true beliefs. This may be unnerving to some, but it shouldn’t be treated as a denial of (1). (Note: I’m not saying I endorse the Churchlands’ eliminativism, I’m inclined to rejected. But come to think of it, I’m not sure I’d say it’s false so much as an overblown version of a legitimate point.)
On the other hand, some of the trouble with relativism seems to be taking (2) too far, never mind what’s being said about (1). For example, some people make the jump from saying our representations are imperfect to saying no representation can be better than another. For example, Peter Singer has convincingly argued that there are ambiguities in the concepts of “life” and “death” underlying our commonsense ethics. While this may trouble medical ethics, it doesn’t mean our concepts of life and death are worthless, or that the problems with the concepts should be made an issue in an ordinary murder trial.
Being as largely unversed in philosophy as I am, 1) and 2) are kind of synonymous since 1) is usually 2) – knowing how things are as opposed to how they aren’t is a good property of our beliefs and assertions – aren’t they?
There are a great many more kinds of truth than just these two. You should pick up one of the recent collections on the subject, but you might understand it better if you brush up on philosophy of mathematics at the same time.
Generally speaking, this discussion could encompass the entire realist/anti-realist debate. Realists are generally going for (1). Most anti-realists (at least the ones worth reading) are going for something like (2). Truth-(1) involves intension, while truth-(2) involves meaning.