“This can’t be said for instrumental oughts.”

Sure it can, because blame, praise, and accountability are all grounded in the same instrumental way. Blame is instrumental in satisfying the desire for justice. Praise is instrumental in promoting more of the same kind of positive behavior. Accountability is instrumental in maintaining a positive environment where the full spectrum of our desires can continue to be maintained. It is tautologically true, that if some moral concept is not “instrumental” or goal oriented, there is by definition no reason to be concerned about it. And your moral facts are not grounded after all.

As Doc Brown would say, “You just aren’t thinking 4th dimensionally…”

Ben

The idea you attribute to Fyfe and Carrier uses ought in a purely instrumental way. Most philosophers, I suspect, wouldn’t spend much time on this conception, because the moral ought has other characteristics – e.g., grounding blame, praise, and accountability. This can’t be said for instrumental oughts.

I haven’t read MacIntyre but as Chris says he is, broadly speaking, a virtue theorist. So the point for him would be that some descriptions are, in some sense, moral descriptions. The point is to highlight this particular kind of description. The virtues can be had or exercised by persons, and it seems like we could discuss these matters completely (so the claim goes) without invoking deontological language.

When we say that someone “ought” to do something, we are saying that someone should perform some action given their desires as reasons to act and the facts about how these desires can be actualized.

For example: If I want to drive to Florida, but my car needs a full tank of gas to get to Florida, then assuming I have the means to purchase the gas I ought to purchase the gas.