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	<title>Comments on: What is physicalism?</title>
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	<link>http://www.uncrediblehallq.net/2009/10/19/what-is-physicalism/</link>
	<description>Best blog name ever</description>
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		<title>By: Alejandro</title>
		<link>http://www.uncrediblehallq.net/2009/10/19/what-is-physicalism/comment-page-1/#comment-5800</link>
		<dc:creator>Alejandro</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2009 04:04:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think your definition has the problem that it assumes from the start the system is physical. A dualist epiphenomenalist who believed in mental entities that are not physical and do not affect physical systems could accept your defintion as true regarding all physical systems, but would not be a physicalist.

Maybe you could amend it to: &quot;Given a complete physical description of any isolated system, complete knowledge of the laws of physics, and unlimited calculating power, we could in principle know every way the system could evolve within the laws of nature, and the probability of each possible evolution.&quot; That is, shift the word &quot;physical&quot; to make it apply to the description, and let the system be any existing one, including minds.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think your definition has the problem that it assumes from the start the system is physical. A dualist epiphenomenalist who believed in mental entities that are not physical and do not affect physical systems could accept your defintion as true regarding all physical systems, but would not be a physicalist.</p>
<p>Maybe you could amend it to: &#8220;Given a complete physical description of any isolated system, complete knowledge of the laws of physics, and unlimited calculating power, we could in principle know every way the system could evolve within the laws of nature, and the probability of each possible evolution.&#8221; That is, shift the word &#8220;physical&#8221; to make it apply to the description, and let the system be any existing one, including minds.</p>
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		<title>By: Huenemann</title>
		<link>http://www.uncrediblehallq.net/2009/10/19/what-is-physicalism/comment-page-1/#comment-5799</link>
		<dc:creator>Huenemann</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2009 19:21:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.uncrediblehallq.net/?p=801#comment-5799</guid>
		<description>I recently read &quot;Every Thing Must Go&quot; by Ladyman &amp; Ross, which is heavy going, but probably important to read to get a good grip on what physicalism means, according to today&#039;s science. Whether everything can be explained in terms of physics, per se, is in interesting topic -- not because of ghostly immaterial things, but because there seem to be some phenomena which only exist and can only be explained at non-basic levels of ontology. Example: you can, in a way, explain everything a calculator does in terms of basic physical forces, etc., but you really won&#039;t have a good explanation for why it tends to do arithmetic correctly until you &quot;ascend&quot; to a programming level. But is the programming level a physicalistic one?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I recently read &#8220;Every Thing Must Go&#8221; by Ladyman &amp; Ross, which is heavy going, but probably important to read to get a good grip on what physicalism means, according to today&#8217;s science. Whether everything can be explained in terms of physics, per se, is in interesting topic &#8212; not because of ghostly immaterial things, but because there seem to be some phenomena which only exist and can only be explained at non-basic levels of ontology. Example: you can, in a way, explain everything a calculator does in terms of basic physical forces, etc., but you really won&#8217;t have a good explanation for why it tends to do arithmetic correctly until you &#8220;ascend&#8221; to a programming level. But is the programming level a physicalistic one?</p>
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